Case law is where a lot of SQE1 marks quietly slip away, not because candidates don’t know the statutes, but because they can’t pin the right authority to the right principle under exam pressure.
SQE1 follows single best answer format questions and test takers often wrong due to the fact all options close to the correct one. This can be addressed if you are able to know concepts / principles decided through cases.
This reference collects the case law examiners actually draw on for the Wills and Administration of Estates and Trusts Law areas of FLK2, organised by topic so you can revise by theme rather than hunting through a long alphabetical list.
Wills & Administration
Capacity & Knowledge / Approval
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) – Core test for testamentary capacity: testator must understand (1) the nature of making a will and its effects, (2) the extent of the property being disposed of, and (3) the moral claims they ought to give effect to.
Questions are often asked testing your knowledge on determining testamentary capacity.
Parker v Felgate (1883) – A will remains valid if the testator had capacity when giving instructions, the will was drawn up in accordance with those instructions, and the testator understood they were signing a will made per those instructions — even if capacity later declines.
In the Estate of Cook (1960) – A will signed “your loving mother” was still validly signed — no requirement for a formal signature, just intent to authenticate.
Wintle v Nye (1959) – Where a beneficiary is involved in preparing the will, the suspicious circumstances rebut the usual presumption of knowledge and approval.
Gill v Woodall (2010) – The presumption of knowledge and approval does not apply where there is no evidence the testator read the will or had it explained to them.
Negligence & Duty of Care
Humbleston v Martin Tolhurst Partnership (2004) – A solicitor drafting a will owes a duty of care to intended beneficiaries, not only to the testator — failure to follow formalities can amount to negligence.
Property Outside the Estate
Aroso v Coutts & Co (2002) – Key authority on beneficial ownership of joint bank accounts — a presumed resulting trust can still apply here, unlike in family home cases, absent an express declaration.
Trusts
Three Certainties
Knight v Knight (1840) – Foundational case establishing the three certainties required for a valid express trust: certainty of intention, subject matter, and objects.
Paul v Constance (1977) – Repeated statements such as “the money is as much yours as mine” over a joint account were sufficient to show certainty of intention, despite no formal trust language being used.
Re Adams and Kensington Vestry (1884) – Precatory words (“in full confidence”, “I wish”) generally indicate a moral obligation rather than a binding trust — no certainty of intention.
Lambe v Eames (1871) – The phrase “in any way she may think best” was held to create an absolute gift, not a trust — certainty of intention was lacking.
Hunter v Moss (1993) – A trust over unsegregated, intangible, identical property (e.g. shares of the same class) can still satisfy certainty of subject matter without physical segregation.
Re London Wine Co (1986) – Contrasted with Hunter v Moss: tangible, unascertained goods (specific bottles of wine) cannot be the subject of a valid trust without segregation from the bulk.
Harvard Securities (1997) – Followed Hunter v Moss — held that a trust can exist over an unsegregated number of shares within a larger holding of the same class.
IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust (1954) – Established the “complete list” test for certainty of objects in fixed trusts — every beneficiary must be capable of being listed.
McPhail v Doulton (1971) – Relaxed the test for discretionary trusts to the “is or is not” (individual ascertainability) test — no need for a complete list.
Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) (1973) – Applied and refined the McPhail test — objects must be conceptually certain, though evidential difficulty in tracing individuals does not itself invalidate the trust.
Secret Trusts
Kasperbauer v Griffiths (2000) – Secret trusts require the three certainties and are treated as a species of constructive trust, upheld to prevent fraud — exempting them from s.53(1)(b) LPA formalities via s.53(2).
Margulies v Margulies (2000) – Illustrates the evidential difficulty of proving a secret trust was sufficiently communicated and intended, as opposed to a mere moral request.
Fiduciary Duties & Breach
Keech v Sandford (1726) – A trustee who personally renews a lease that was refused to the trust holds the new lease on constructive trust for the beneficiaries, even absent bad faith.
Boardman v Phipps (1967) – A fiduciary who profits from information or an opportunity obtained in their fiduciary capacity must account for the profit, even where they acted honestly and the trust benefited.
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (1942) – Directors must account for unauthorised profits made from their position, regardless of good faith or benefit conferred on the company.
FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital (2014) – Bribes or secret commissions received by a fiduciary are held on constructive trust (a proprietary remedy), overruling the earlier personal‑remedy approach in Sinclair v Versailles.
Dishonest Assistance & Knowing Receipt
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan (1995) – Established the objective dishonesty test for accessory (dishonest assistance) liability in a breach of trust.
Barlow Clowes International v Eurotrust International (2005) – Confirmed and clarified the objective test for dishonesty in dishonest assistance claims.
Ivey v Genting Casinos (2017) – Reformulated the general test for dishonesty — an objective standard applied to the facts as the accused actually knew or believed them to be.
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley (2002) – Introduced a partly subjective test for dishonesty which has since been disapproved — useful to recognise as the outdated approach, not to apply.
Charitable Trusts
Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd (1951) – The “personal nexus” test: a class of beneficiaries linked by relationship to one individual or employer, however large, is not a “section of the public” — so an education trust for employees’ children failed as charitable.
Re Compton (1945) – Earlier authority establishing the personal nexus principle later approved and applied in Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co.
Dingle v Turner (1972) – Carved out the “poor relations” exception to the personal nexus rule, allowing certain poverty trusts to remain charitable despite a personal connection.
How to Use This Case Law Reference for SQE1 Revision
The strongest way to use this list is topic-first, not case-first: pick a rule you’re shaky on (say, certainty of intention in trusts) and read every case grouped under that heading together, so you see how the authorities build on and contrast with each other — for example, how Re London Wine Co and Hunter v Moss pull in opposite directions on certainty of subject matter depending on whether the property is tangible or intangible.
Once you can explain each principle without looking, test yourself the other way round — case name first, principle recalled from memory. This mirrors how SQE1 single best answer questions actually work: you’re given a fact pattern and expected to identify which authority applies, not recite case names on demand.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do I need to cite case names in SQE1 answers?
SQE1 is a multiple-choice format, so you never write out a case citation yourself. However, questions are frequently built directly around the facts of a well-known case, and knowing the underlying principle is often what distinguishes the correct answer from a plausible distractor.
What’s the most important case for testamentary capacity on SQE1?
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) is the foundational authority: a testator must understand the nature of making a will and its effects, the extent of the property being disposed of, and the moral claims they ought to consider. Nearly every capacity question on FLK2 traces back to this three-part test.
What is the difference between Hunter v Moss and Re London Wine Co?
Hunter v Moss held that a trust over unsegregated but intangible, identical property (such as shares of the same class) can satisfy certainty of subject matter without physical segregation. Re London Wine Co reached the opposite conclusion for tangible, unascertained goods, holding that specific bottles of wine could not be the subject of a valid trust unless segregated from the bulk.
Reference compiled for SQE1 revision purposes and is not legal advice. Always verify against the current SRA Assessment Specification and primary sources before an exam sitting.
